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Introduction
In the late 1840's, Ignaz Semmelweis, a Hungarian physician working in the Lying-In hospital in Vienna, showed that the high death rate among women giving birth in the hospital was due to the transfer of a toxic substance from the hands of medical students who had worked on cadavers and then attended to the women in the maternity ward. This knowledge was used to dramatically lower the death rate by having the students wash their hands with a disinfectant before attending to patients. A few years later, another physician, John Snow, showed that the cholera epidemic that hit London was transmitted by contaminated water.
By the late 1870's, the germ theory of disease had been put on a firm empirical footing (Nester et. al., 1998) . Nevertheless, more than a century later, 70 percent of those surveyed in a village in rural Bolivia thought that diarrhea was a normal occurrence in childhood (Quick et. al., 1997) , while 45 percent of those surveyed in a suburb of Delhi in the study reported here did not include drinking contaminated water among the possible causes of diarrhea.
These stories illustrate two points: first, that relevant information helps people protect themselves from environmental hazards such as infectious disease, and second, that despite this, such information spreads slowly through conventional avenues like school education.
The economics literature has laid more emphasis on wealth than on information as a determinant of the willingness to pay to protect oneself from environmental and health hazards. 1 Just how quantitatively significant is the role of information in this regard? In this paper, we examine this question in the context of drinking-water quality. This is an extremely important issue in the developing world where there are 1.7 million deaths and 54 million disability adjusted life years lost annually due to unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene. Furthermore, 90 percent of the deaths are those of children (WHO, 2002) .
We conducted a randomized experiment in Gurgaon, a suburb of Delhi, in which we tested approximately 1,000 randomly selected households' drinking water for the presence of bacteria of fecal origin. About 60 percent of the water (before any home purification) tested "dirty" i.e., positive for the presence of fecal bacteria.
2 By way of comparison, in the United States, if even a single sample of tap water tests positive for fecal coliforms, then the local water authority is in violation of federal regulations issued under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
3 These regulations also stipulate that local authorities inform individual households about any violation of the standards in their jurisdiction. In India, on the other hand, tap water is unregulated and the results of any water quality tests conducted by government authorities are generally not made public (McKenzie and Ray, 2004) . 1 As exemplified in the literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve surveyed in Borghesi [1999] .
2 Throughout the paper, we use the term "clean" to indicate that the water tested negative for the presence of fecal bacteria and the term "dirty" to mean that the water tested positive for the presence of fecal bacteria. 3 Source: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mcl.html
In the second round, we informed a randomly selected group of about half the households in our sample of their water test results. Returning about seven weeks later, we found that households who were told that their water was "dirty" (indicating the likelihood of fecal contamination) and were initially not doing any home water purification were 11 percentage points more likely to have begun doing so as compared to households who had not been informed of the test result. 4 How should we evaluate the size of this effect ? Jalan et. al. (2003) using National Family Health Survey data for urban Indian households found that the probability of home water purification rose by 5-12 percentage points when moving from one wealth quartile to the next, while it rose by 1(1.4) percentage points with a year's increase in schooling of the most educated male (female) member of the household. Likewise, we find, using the crosssection from the first round of our survey in Gurgaon, that an additional year of schooling for the most educated member of the household is associated with a 4 percentage-point rise in the probability of purification while a move from one wealth quartile to the next is associated with a 15 percentage-point rise.
Even one-time targeted information of this nature can have considerable effects on awareness. Whether such awareness will ultimately lead to a significant decline in the incidence of water-borne disease is another question beyond the scope of this paper. However, what the experimental results do indicate is to the extent that the failure of public authorities to provide safe water is due to lack of demand (whether by way of political expression or lack of willingness to pay for improvements), regular water testing and public information campaigns can help mitigate this problem at a relatively low cost.
More generally, measuring the demand for environmental quality and attempting to draw welfare and policy conclusions from it without addressing the issue of under-provision of information can lead to significant underestimates. It is not surprising, given the public-good aspect of information about environmental risks, that it is underprovided.
As yet, little attention has been paid to this issue in the literature. The only experimental study of which we are aware is not from a developing country. This is Smith et. al.'s (1995) study of mitigating behavior in response to different information booklets on cancer risks from radon gas given to a sample of US households in New York state by the Environmental Protection Agency. They found that radon readings and the manner of presentation of information about the health risks of radon influenced the decision to take mitigating action. Antle and Pingali (1994) studied pesticide use in rice farming in the Philippines and found that insecticides were heavily over-used because farmers were not sufficiently aware of their adverse chronic (long-term) health effects. These are not easily perceptible, unlike acute (immediate) effects. It is notable that this conclusion applies to private profitability with health effects being valued by their productivity losses alone.
With regard to drinking-water quality, apart from Jalan et. al. (2003) mentioned above, Roy et. al. (2004) found, controlling for income, that the elasticity of water purification expenditure of households in Kolkata, India with respect to years of schooling of the most educated member of the household was approximately unity. Dasgupta (2004) and McConnell and Rosado (2000) found that in Delhi and an urban area of Brazil respectively, education of the household head was statistically significant in the decision to purify water, although they do not report the 4 Although public provision of safe water may be a more effective way to prevent disease, we measured home treatment because it is the only response we can expect from households in the short term and is easy to implement. In fact, among environmental goods, we chose to study clean drinking water not only because of its intrinsic importance but also because private mitigating actions that can be easily recorded are available to households. size of the effects (these not being their main concern). This is suggestive of the role of information that is examined more closely below.
The following section describes the experiment and the sampling design. Section 3 provides details about the data and reports some summary statistics. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework and the results from the experiment. Section 5 concludes.
The Experiment
Our study area is the city of Gurgaon, in the state of Haryana in India and a suburb of the national capital, New Delhi. 5 We chose Gurgaon because we wanted a residential urban area where the water supply to households was not of uniform quality, where there was some heterogeneity among the population in terms of their general awareness of sanitation and health issues, and that was sufficiently compact so as to make for easy implementation of the survey.
In July and August 2003, we conducted a pilot survey of the quality of water supplied to residential households in randomly chosen areas of Gurgaon. We used water-testing kits that test for the presence or absence of bacteria of fecal origin. While most fecal bacteria are not themselves pathogenic, their presence shows that pathogens may be present since most water-borne pathogens are of fecal origin. Direct tests for the presence of pathogens are expensive and so testing for fecal coliform bacteria is the standard method of testing for exposure to waterborne disease worldwide (WHO, 1997) . Our test kits were purchased from TARA, a non-profit development organization based in Delhi. More than 90 percent of the approximately 30 samples from the pilot survey were contaminated.
Once we had identified our sampling frame, we used 2001 census data at the enumeration block (EB) level to create a wealth index based on the first principal component of a number of indicators. 6 We excluded all those EB's where at the time of the 2001 census house-listing, there were fewer than 50 census buildings. Old Gurgaon includes 240 EB's in the municipality, 19 EB's in Sukhrali village and 28 EB's in Gurgaon village. 7 After categorizing the EB's into wealth quintiles, we used EB maps provided by the census bureau for our house lists. Our objective was to choose a random sample of 1,000 households, stratified by wealth, from all EB's so as to over-sample households from the middle three quintiles and under-sample from the top and bottom quintiles. 8 Our final sample consisted of 60 and 70 households respectively from Sukhrali and Gurgaon villages representing the lowest wealth quintile, and 870 households (120 from the top quintile and 250 each from the middle quintiles) from Gurgaon municipality. There are two sections in Gurgaon -new Gurgaon, an area that has witnessed rapid growth over the last decade and old Gurgaon which has been in existence for four to five decades. Our sampling frame includes only old Gurgaon for which the 2001 census maps were readily available. 6 This was created in the same way as the household-level index described in Section 3 below. The variables included in the wealth index are: Predominant material of the floor, wall, and roof, condition of house, ownership status, number of dwelling rooms within the house, drinking water source, lighting source, whether kitchen, bathroom, latrine are within the house, type of waste-water outlet house is connected to, type of fuel used for cooking, whether household possesses a radio/transistor, television, telephone, bicycles, scooter/motorcycle/moped, car/ jeep/ van, and whether the household avails of banking services.
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The latter two were once villages but are now in the middle of urban Gurgaon. 8 We adopted this sampling strategy because the poor may be constrained by wealth from acting upon the information they would receive during the experiment while most of the wealthy might already have adopted home water purification.
9
Two possible substitutes were included for each household in the sample. 296 households were actually substituted, 50 because no respondent was available, 76 because they did not wish to be surveyed, and 171 because the house could not be located from the map or was a commercial establishment.
Between November 13 and December 23, 2003, we conducted the survey and gathered information on household demographics, source and quality of the households' drinking water, whether they used any purification method, and general awareness of the household about health and sanitation issues. The awareness module was administered first with households being told that the survey was about health and awareness so that their responses would not be influenced by questions on water.
10 A time-line of the survey is given in Figure 1 .
At the end of each interview, a sample of each household's drinking water, both unpurified and purified (if any) was collected in testing bottles and resealed immediately after collection. Each bottle contained a slip of filter paper impregnated with nutrients, the major one being peptone. The bottles were kept in an incubator at body temperature for 48 hours after which, if they contained fecal bacteria, they would produce hydrogen sulfide, which would create iron sulfide, a black precipitate, otherwise remaining clear.
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10 A copy of the household survey questionnaire is available from the authors. 11 The use of the incubator was convenient because we had a large number of samples, but is not required. Hydrogen sulfide tests have been shown to agree with other tests at rates ranging from 71 to 100 percent in different studies, with only one study showing a disagreement rate greater than 20 percent (Sobsey and Pfaender, 2002) .
Figure 1: Time-line of Survey Process
During the second round (January 17- February 1, 2004,) we wanted to administer the treatment to approximately half of the originally selected sample. However, we were concerned that randomizing at the household level could potentially contaminate our control group because of the possible proximity of treatment and control households. So we divided the sample into S wards (which are aggregations of EB's) of which a subset s was randomly chosen as treatment units. All sampled households in a treatment ward were given the treatment. s was chosen so that the number of households in the treatment group was close to half the full sample. We revisited 520 households from our original sample of 1,000 households.
Households in the treatment group were given their test results and a handout (see Appendix 1 for details) explaining the results. Each household was also given its water sample bottle(s) and told that if the contents of a bottle were black, then its water was likely to contain germs. The remainder of the handout suggested that the households could, if they wished, adopt one of a number of purification methods in use in Gurgaon as appropriate for their budget. The respondent's attention was drawn to the different methods, a brief remark about their effectiveness in removing pathogens, and their cost. Information on safe water storage and handling practices were also included in the handout.
In the third and final round (March 2004) , we revisited all sampled households. There was some attrition from our original number of sampled households due to relocation to another address. Our final complete sample (i.e. three rounds of data for the treatment group and two rounds for the control group) consisted of 965 households indicating a sample attrition of 4 percent. There were no statistically significant differences between the observed characteristics of the households that dropped out and those that remained in the sample. Nor was there a statistically significant difference in the proportion of drop-outs from the treatment and control groups.
We surveyed households (see Appendix 2 for this questionnaire) to see whether they had changed their water purification behavior in any way. Households in the control group were visited first, and were given their test results and the handouts that the households in the treatment group had received earlier in the second round. This meant that households in the treatment group were surveyed approximately eight weeks after they were given the information about their water quality and the handout. Tables 1 and 2 report several descriptive statistics on information gathered during the first round for the whole sample (column 2) and for treatment (T=1 in column 3) and control (T=0 in column 4) groups. The tables also report the test statistics (column 5) for the difference in means across the treatment and control groups. The numbers in these tables indicate that the randomization produced relatively balanced treatment groups. That is, means of observable characteristics are very similar across groups and none of the differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 we report statistics on the quality (as measured by our water test results) of water supply in Gurgaon. Two points are striking in this table: contamination rates of unpurified water are high -61 percent of unpurified water tested "dirty" i.e., positive for the presence of fecal bacteria. Secondly, private purification methods (including boiling) are not very effective in reducing the contamination rates -55 percent of home-purified drinking water tested "dirty". A fecal contamination rate of 61 percent is high relative to developed countries, where fecal contamination levels of tap water are typically zero, but is comparable to some parts of India for which only fragmentary information is available. According to the Sukthankar Committee report to the Government of Maharashtra, bacteriological contamination was found in 10 percent of water samples from municipalities over the state in 1999, with the figure for Mumbai being 14 percent, while a survey in Kolkata in 2003 found that 63 percent of taps had high levels of fecal contamination (McKenzie and Ray, 2004) . The reasons for such high levels include inadequate sanitation, sometimes large numbers of animals in urban areas, and leaky public water supply and sewage systems. In Gurgaon, as in most of urban India, water is supplied intermittently for a couple of hours in a day, and not continuously. As a result, pipes are not always pressurized and (illegal) private pumps attached to the main lines suck in possibly contaminated water.
Of the 186 households whose water tested "clean" before purification, in 72 (38.71 percent) cases the water tested "dirty" after purification. These numbers suggest that considerable contamination is taking place within the household, this being partly a consequence of the necessity of storing water within the home, a need which arises because of the intermittent supply. 12 However, at least one study has shown that within-household fecal contamination of stored water is less infectious than pathogens introduced from outside the household (VanDerslice and Briscoe, 1993).
Given pervasive externalities from disease prevention and the likelihood of re-contamination of stored water within households, a continuous pressurized publicly treated water supply may be more effective in reducing disease than home treatment would. We however, focused our study on home treatment because it is the only easily measurable response we can expect from households in the short term. In any case, it is also of interest to ask how much the demand for safe water changes with the inexpensive information we provide so that the public provision of safe water may be better financed.
About 6 percent of households had at least one case of diarrhea in the month preceding the survey. However these percentages cannot be assumed to reflect the situation throughout the year because there are seasonal variations in the incidence of diarrhea in India with most cases occurring during the summer months between May Within-household fecal contamination of drinking water is a commonly observed phenomenon in developing countries (Wright et. al., 2004) .
and August. Dasgupta (2004) , using hospital records for the years 1996-1998 from poor localities in neighboring Delhi, reports that only 1 percent of the annual number of recorded diarrhea cases were observed in the months of November and December while the months of June, July, and August accounted for 69 percent of total cases. We did not find a statistically significant difference in the incidence of diarrhea between households that had contaminated drinking water and those that did not.
13
Nearly three-quarters of the 41 percent of households using some form of purification in the first round (Appendix Table 1 ) were using methods (boiling, electric filters, or bottled water as a substitute) believed to remove all germs if properly used. 14 The average annual household expenditure on purification in the sample was Rs 253 (Rupee 1 ≈ US 2 cents). It was Rs 625 among households that used some form of purification (See Appendix 3).
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Using the latest available household consumption expenditure numbers for urban Haryana (NSS Report No. 484, December 2003), these purification expenditure numbers suggest that an average household in Gurgaon was spending less than .04 percent of its total annual expenditure on water purification methods.
16
Gurgaon households are better educated and wealthier than the average urban Indian household. According to the 2001 census, literacy rates for males and females (in the 7+ age group) in urban India are 80 percent and 73 percent respectively. Assuming that all those who have completed one year of schooling are literate, the corresponding percentages for our sample are 93 and 86 respectively. Likewise, the percent of households possessing consumer durables like a television, telephone, two-wheeler or four-wheeler are higher than the average for urban India. In urban India, 64 percent of households have a television while in Gurgaon 97 percent do. The analogous numbers for telephones, two-wheelers, and four-wheelers are 23 and 79, 25 and 75, and 6 and 36 respectively (Source: Census 2001 and Gurgaon sample survey).
But, despite these above average education and wealth statistics, when asked what causes diarrhea, only 55 percent of the households mentioned drinking contaminated or dirty water, and strikingly, only 7 percent mentioned infection (Table 2) , indicating a low level of awareness about the health hazards associated with poor drinking water quality.
We created wealth and awareness indices using the first principal component of appropriate variables. That is, the weights used on each of the variables were such that the linear combination captured the greatest amount of information common to all variables. The wealth index for the i th household was thus defined as: 13 Owing to circumstances beyond our control we could not conduct the survey during the summer months when diarrhea would be more common and differences in its incidence more likely to be detectable. 14 53 households who said that they were purifying their water but failed to give us a sample of their purified water during the first round of the survey were assumed to be not purifying their drinking water. All regressions were run making the opposite assumption as well. The results are very close to our favored specification and so are not reported separately. 15 Expenditures were calculated by annualizing fixed costs where necessary. 16 The average per capita consumer expenditure in Haryana was Rs.13,500 and the average household size was 4.8 members.
where a ij is the standardized (mean zero and standard deviation one) variable j for household i, and f j is the "scoring factor" for the j th asset. (f1 ,…, fn) maximizes the sample variance of w subject to the constraint . A higher value of the index indicates more wealth or a more aware household. We created dummy variables for households having values of these indices higher than the median. The variables included in the wealth index were: possession of a refrigerator, radio, computer, television, phone, washing-machine, bicycle, two-wheeler, four-wheeler, whether household owns the house it lives in, whether household possess land other than current residence, whether the house has a permanent structure, whether there is a separate kitchen and whether there is an air-exhaust outlet in the kitchen.
The (binary) variables included in the awareness index were: respondent listed contaminated water among the causes of diarrhea, mentioned infection among the causes of diarrhea, respondent stated diarrhea can be prevented by purifying water, respondent thinks the government can prevent diarrhea by providing clean water, respondent thinks government can prevent diarrhea by providing proper sanitation, and household uses a safe method to draw their drinking water from a storage container.
In Appendix Table 2 , we report marginal effects from probit regressions of whether or not a household adopts any drinking water purification method on a number of explanatory variables for each of the two wealth categories. Awareness does not raise the probability of purification for households in the lower (i.e., below median) wealth category but does so by 3 percentage points for those above median wealth. The effects of wealth and education are also higher among households above median wealth. 
Model and Results
The household will not be purifying its water initially if (1) where D denotes the utility differential between purification and no purification, p 0 denote a household's prior probability that its water is unsafe or contaminated, w denotes the household's wealth, c(w) the utility cost of purification and v is an error term. The household will switch to purification if : c(w) + u > 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) where the distribution of u is conditional on (1), and p equals p 0 , p + , or p -, depending on whether the household was in the control group and so did not receive a test result, received a positive result (i.e. water is "dirty"), or received a negative result (i.e. water is "clean") respectively. Other things equal, we expect p 0 and, therefore, also p + and p -, to be increasing in awareness, and c to be decreasing in w.
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We can express the above as follows:
otherwise, where
In equation (3), ry is the difference in the indicator variable for purification between the third and first rounds, (+ve) denotes a positive test result indicating contamination and (-ve) denotes a negative test result indicating no contamination, w u is a dummy for households having wealth greater than the median, and a u is a dummy for households having awareness greater than the median. The discussion above leads us to expect that ß 1 , ß 3 , and ß 4 > 0. We also estimate a model in which the dependent variable is the change in purification expenditure. Given that all the regressors in equation (3) are dummy variables, linearity imposes no restriction on the functional form, and hence the coefficients are simply the differences in conditional means.
We estimated equation (3) conditioning on households who were not initially purifying because this is the population of primary interest. 19 We want to know how their willingness to pay for safe water (as revealed by their purification choices) will respond to information. This will also provide a benchmark to public authorities about the extent to which households' willingness to pay to finance improvements in water quality increase with information provision. We also estimate a similar model, conditioning on initial purification to see whether households stop purifying in response to a "clean" water test result, a possibility suggested by the fact that p -< p 0 .
18 Let λ = Pr(+ve | contamination) be the probability of a "dirty" water result conditional on the water being contaminated and µ = Pr(-ve | no contamination) be the probability of a "clean" water result conditional on the water being not contaminated. The posterior probability of unsafe water conditional on a positive test result is:
and the posterior probability of unsafe water conditional on a "clean" water result is: . 19 This conditioning also implies that ry = 1 if a household switches from being a non-purifier to a purifier and zero otherwise.
Equation (3) is estimated using least squares and coefficients are reported in Table 3 . All standard errors have been corrected for clustering at the ward level.
The first row shows that households who were told that their water is "dirty" are on average, 11 percentage points more likely to start purifying than those in the control group confirming our expectation above that p + > p 0 . This difference is statistically highly significant. Of the 29 who were told that their water was "dirty" and started purification, 19 chose one of the three most expensive methods: boiling, using an electric filter, or buying bottled water, while only 4 of the 11 from the control group that started purification chose one of these three methods. Households who were told that their drinking water was probably not contaminated were not statistically significantly different in changing their purification behavior relative to the control group.
The difference β 3 in the response of households belonging to the upper and lower wealth categories to a "dirty" water test result is strongly significant. Households in the upper wealth category are nearly 16 percentage points more likely to start purification. It is not surprising that richer households are more likely to make protective expenditures in response to information. This result parallels the finding from the cross-sectional probit regressions based on the first-round survey that awareness is associated with a higher probability of purification for those above median wealth but not for those below median wealth (Appendix Table 2 ). The wealth effect in Table 3 can also be seen in Figure 2 .
Table 3: Effects of Treatment on Purification and Expenditures of Households not Initially Purifying their Drinking Water
Notes:
• ry = y after -y before where y is the purification dummy (column 2) or purification expenditure (column 3)
• Numbers in parentheses are the cluster-corrected standard errors • * indicates significance at 5 percent or lower • ** indicates significance levels between 5 and 10 percent However, the difference β 4 in the response to a "dirty" water result of households who are more and less aware is not statistically significant. So even though the model predicts p + to be increasing in awareness, we do not find that in our sample. We also estimated an alternative model where instead of using the awareness index categories as defined above, we used the maximum years of education among adult females as an awareness indicator (Appendix Table 4 ). The results are similar to those reported in Table 3 .
The third column of Table 3 examines the impact of a "dirty" water result, and its interactions with wealth and awareness, on changes in household expenditures. The qualitative results are similar to that for changes in purification behavior. The expected increase in annual purification expenditure of a non-purifying household receiving a "dirty" water result is Rs. 48 more than that of non-purifying control households (Rupee 1 ≈ US 2 cents). By way of comparison, the mean initial purification expenditure of all households in the sample was Rs 253.
The mean impact of a "dirty" water result on expenditures incurred by households belonging to the upper wealth category (relative to the lower wealth group) is as much as Rs. 87. As in the case of changes in purification behavior, we find no impact of differences in awareness levels among households getting a "dirty" water result on changes in expenditure.
Another outcome of interest is whether the survey and the treatment given to the households induced them to hold discussions about water quality with family, friends, neighbors or others after the first round. While households may be wealth-constrained in responding to information by adopting some purification, this is not the case for Table 4 reports the results for this outcome. Here we estimate the model using the entire sample because there seems no reason to suppose that the outcome would be conditional on whether or not the household purifies its water. The model that we estimate is the same as that reported in Table 3 except that now the outcome variable is discuss.
The interesting result that we get here is that irrespective of whether the household's water tested "dirty" or "clean", on average, the treatment generated enough interest among household members for them to discuss the issue considerably more often than control households. Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the impact was larger (16 as compared to 9 percentage points more than the control) for the group receiving the "dirty" water result. The control group also discussed water quality with a frequency of close to 9 percent. Whether this is a "survey" effect or reflects a pre-existing concern with water quality, is hard to say. The other interesting point emerging from this table, is that the household's initial awareness has a large (16 percentage points) impact on the probability of discussions conditional on a contaminated water result, although the significance level is 7 percent. As expected, wealth does not matter. Notes:
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• Discuss is a dummy for whether the household had any discussion on water quality since the first round of the survey.
• Numbers in parentheses are cluster-corrected standard errors • * indicates significance at 5 percent or lower • ** indicates significance levels between 5 -10 percent
We wanted to check whether there was any effect of the handout (independent of the test result) that we gave to the treatment households in the second round on either their purification behavior or on their expenditures. In the information sheet given to the households, it was clearly mentioned that straining and non-electric filters were inferior purification methods that removed some but not all germs. So we looked at the sub-sample of households who were using a non-electric filter in the first round. We defined our outcome indicator as households who not only made a change in their purification behavior but also used a superior method of purification compared to what they were using earlier. We do not find a "handout effect" on households told that their water was "dirty", but this could be because the sample is smaller than before (See Appendix Table 3 for further details).
Finally, we checked whether on average, households who were initially purifying their water and received a "clean" water result were likely to stop purifying their water as the result that p -< p 0 from the model in Subsection 4.1 might predict. We find no "downgrade impact" of the experiment. (See Appendix Table 3 for further details.)
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we asked how much information affects the demand for environmental quality. We found that Gurgaon households who were told that their drinking water was "dirty" and was, therefore, likely to contain germs, were 11 percentage points (p-value < 0.01) more likely to begin some form of home purification in the next 7 weeks than households that received no information. Among the households that received a positive result (i.e. "dirty" water), households above the median value of wealth were 16 percentage points more likely to start purifying their water than less wealthy households. Households that received a negative test result (i.e., "clean" water) did not behave significantly differently with regard to purification from households that received no information.
The water test kit that we used cost Rs 20 (less than 50 US cents) per sample, is available off the shelf from an NGO in Delhi, and is simple enough for households to use themselves. It is notable that it has an effect on the probability of purification equivalent to about two and a half times that of an additional year of schooling for the most educated member of the household and more than two-thirds that of a move from one wealth quartile to the next. Public education campaigns that include useful information can evidently make a significant impact on people's behavior in terms of avoiding health risks.
Despite Gurgaon being one of the wealthier towns in India, the drinking water sources of 60 percent of households showed evidence of fecal contamination. Gurgaon, like virtually all other Indian cities and many in the developing world, has an intermittent, not a continuous, supply of piped water. This implies that water is more likely to get contaminated outside the home, (since the pipes are not always pressurized), and that it is more likely to get contaminated within the home because it has to be stored before drinking. While the inconvenience of an intermittent water supply is all too obvious, its adverse consequences for health are not widely known. Indeed, as discussed in Section 3 above, the level of awareness in Gurgaon about the role of water in the spread of diarrheal disease is surprisingly low, given its economic condition.
The experimental results suggest that to the extent that the failure of public authorities to provide safe water is due to lack of demand (whether by way of political expression or lack of willingness to pay for improvements), regular water testing and public information campaigns can help mitigate this problem at a relatively low cost. More generally, the issue of under-provision of information should be taken into account whenever estimates of the demand for environmental quality are used for welfare or policy analysis.
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7.
Finally we would like to ask you whether you are planning to make some changes in the future to improve the quality of your drinking water? 
